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Parrino: Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation: Was Kellogg Sleeping on Its

KELLOGG COMPANY V. EXXON CORPORA TION:
WAS KELLOGG SLEEPING ON ITS
TRADEMARK RIGHTS?
INTRODUCTION

After over thirty years of peaceful coexistence, a cat fight has
begun between Kellogg Company's "Tony the Tiger" and Exxon
Corporation's "Whimsical Tiger." Kellogg Company, a Battle
Creek, Michigan-based breakfast cereal maker ("Kellogg") wants
Exxon Corporation, the Irving, Texas-based global energy
company ("Exxon") to stop using Exxon's "Whimsical Tiger"
cartoon and turn over all promotional items that bear the
"Whimsical Tiger" image.' The Exxon Corporation uses the
"Whimsical Tiger" with its slogan "Put a Tiger in Your Tank" and
3
"Tony the Tiger" is Kellogg's Frosted Flakes animated mascot.
On October 7, 1996 Kellogg filed a lawsuit against Exxon in
federal court for the Western District of Tennessee for Exxon's use
of the "Whimsical Tiger" image alleging various claims of
trademark infiingement. Kellogg's complaint included: federal
trademark infringement; false designation of origin and false
representation; and federal trademark dilution.4 State claims
included state unfair competition; palming off; and state trademark
infringement and dilution.5 Kellogg also sought declaratory relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, claiming the Exxon
abandoned the "Whimsical Tiger" trademark.6
In addition,
Kellogg sought injunctive relief to prohibit Exxon from continued
1. Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation, No. 96-3070 G/A at 9
(W.D.Tenn. Aug. 28, 1998).

2. Associated Press, Kellogg and Exxon In a Cat Fight Over Their Tigers;
CerealMaker Sues, Alleging Infringement On Its Trademark,BALT. SUN, Oct.
1, 1998, at 3C.
3. Francis A. McMorris, Kellogg Sues Exxon Over Tiger; Judge Declares,
"You'rrrrrLate!", WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998 atB1.
4. Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation, No. 96-3070 G/A at 9
(W.D.Tenn. Aug. 28, 1998).
5. T.C.A. § 47-18-101 et seq. ("Tennessee Consumer Protection Act").
6. Id. at 10.
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use of its cartoon tiger and requested that all Exxon items that bear
the "Whimsical 'Tiger" image be delivered to Kellogg and
destroyed.' Finally, Kellogg prayed for attorneys' fees and any
other relief the court deemed appropriate.8
This case note will address the facts of this case9 , the parties
respective arguments, the court's analysis, and finally it will
conclude with a comment in light of the Kellogg v. Exxon decision.
KELLOGG COMPANY V. EXXON CORPORATION

I. Facts
In 1952, Kellogg registered and began to use the cartoon tiger,
"Tony the Tiger" in connection with the sale of Kellogg's Frosted
Flakes Cereal.'0 In 1959, Exxon created a cartoon tiger known as
the "Whimsical Tiger"" to promote petroleum products in a
national advertising campaign known as "Put a Tiger in Your
Tank.' 12 Kellogg admits that it was aware of the existence and use
of Exxon's "Whimsical Tiger" during the 1960's."3 Exxon
obtained a trademark for their tiger without opposition. 4 From the
mid-1970's to the early 1980's, Exxon used their cartoon tiger on
its premium grade gasoline pumps at Exxon stations across the
nation."5 The "Whimsical Tiger" has been used extensively by
Exxon in general advertising since the 1960's16
In 1968, Kellogg requested that Exxon not oppose Kellogg's
application for a German trademark. 7 In 1972, Exxon used its
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The judge in this case granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment on
laches and acquiescence in addition to granting Exxon's motion for partial
summary judgment on Kellogg's claim of abandonment. The order resolved
other pending motions as well. As a result, the scope of this case note will deal
ultimately with the issues as they relate to laches and acquiescence.
10. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 2.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 4.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5

2

Parrino: Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation: Was Kellogg Sleeping on Its

1998]

KELLOGG V. EXXON

cartoon tiger for another national advertising campaign that was
designed to promote Exxon's change in name from Esso to
Exxon. 8 In the latter portion of the 1970's, Exxon continued to
use its cartoon tiger in its national campaign entitled "Energy for a
Strong America." 19
On May 22, 1972, Kellogg expressed a strong concern about
Exxon's use of the tiger in a commercial format that was similar to
a Kellogg advertisement featuring "Tony the Tiger" which aired at
the same time as Exxon's commercial.2 ' Kellogg generally
objected to Exxon's use of their cartoon tiger.2"
During the 1980's, Exxon's advertising agency, McCannErickson, recommended that Exxon introduce a live tiger in
connection with its point-of-sale advertisements and general motor
fuel sales. 22 Exxon followed McCann-Erickson's advice and
temporarily discontinued its use of their cartoon tiger in
advertisements for its petroleum and related products; all point-ofsale advertising; and its company publications in order to enhance
the impact of the new live tiger.2 3 In 1981, Exxon began to
modernize and redesign its service stations.24 Exxon phased out
older gasoline pumps which contained "pump skirts" and gasoline
dispensers featuring the "Whimsical Tiger."2
The new
replacement pumps did not have the cartoon tiger on them.26
In 1986, Exxon circulated internal memoranda suggesting ways
by which Exxon should secure the "Whimsical Tiger" trademark in
light of the Company's new focus on the live tiger.2 One such
memorandum requested Exxon dealers feature the cartoon tiger on
the tops of pumps for 120 days. 8 Exxon continued to use the
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

22. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 4-5.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.

27. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 6.
Published28.
by Id.
Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

3

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

DEPAUL J. ART& ENT. LAW

108

[Vol. IX:105

"Whimsical Tiger" on a limited basis by utilizing it in print
advertising, maps and during the 1992 Republican National
Convention in Houston, Texas.29 Throughout the 1980's, Exxon
used the cartoon tiger in such local events as the Texas and
California State fairs." The "Whimsical Tiger" was also used in a
"Color To Win" promotional campaign that was launched in about
300 Exxon stations in the Northeast in 1989, and then again from
1993-1995.31 A total of 1.3 million dollars was spent by Exxon on
cartoon tiger promotions in the West Coast and southern interior of
the United States.32 Exxon retailers continued between 1982 and
1985 to use the "Whimsical Tiger" to promote the sale of car
accessories.33
In 1991, Exxon launched additional campaigns entitled "Win
With the Tiger" and "Save With the Tiger" in which Exxon's
cartoon tiger spokesperson would appear in television
commercials, on merchandise at Exxon locations, and related
scratch-off game cards. 34 Kellogg did not object to the use of the
tiger in such campaigns.3 According to the record, Kellogg did
not object to Exxon's continued use of the cartoon tiger until it
entered into litigation with Exxon in Argentina and Canada in
1992.36

In the mid-1980's, Exxon expanded into the convenience store
market.37 In 1986, Exxon began to distribute "Whimsical Tiger"
decals and feature the slogan "Welcome to Tiger Mart" for display
in Exxon's convenience stores.38 Sometime around 1991, Exxon
decided that all of its future convenience stores would be called
"Tiger Marts." 39 Prior to 1991, Exxon never used the cartoon tiger
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at4.
Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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in connection with the sale of food or food related items. 40 In
1992, Exxon began to use the "Whimsical Tiger" decal with the
name "Tiger Mart" on exterior signs at a location in Houston,
Texas.
Shortly thereafter, six additional "Tiger Mart" stores
displaying the cartoon tiger on exterior signs opened up in cities
including Houston, Memphis, New York, Atlanta and Richmond.42
As a promotional technique, the Exxon stores distributed "Thirst
Tamer" cups that featured the cartoon tiger.43 Convenience marts
opened up in 1993 in the Baltimore/Washington D.C. area, San
Antonio and Austin, which brought the national count of "Tiger
Marts" to greater than sixty.' By 1996, Exxon Corporation had
opened approximately two hundred "Tiger Mart" stores.45
I. Exxon's Argument
The arguments addressed in this section will be the arguments
analyzed by the court in adjudicating Exxon's motion for summary
judgment on laches and acquiescence and Exxon's motion for
summary judgment on Kellogg's abandonment claim, since the
court in this case ultimately dismissed the case by granting
Exxon's motions.46 Exxon's other motions for summary judgment
47
were found to be moot.
'40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 8.
43. Id.

44. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 9.
45. Id.
46. As mentioned, Kellogg alleged federal law claims of trademark
infringement, false designation of origin and false representation, and trademark
dilution. Also, Kellogg alleged under Tennessee law, unfair competition by
"palming off', unfair competition in violation of the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act, and trademark infringement and dilution. In addition, Kellogg
sought declaratory relief claiming that Exxon abandoned its cartoon tiger and
Kellogg sought injunctive relief to prohibit Exxon from continued use of the
cartoon tiger and turn over promotional items bearing the cartoon tiger. Finally,
Kellogg sought recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and any other relief the
court found appropriate.
47. Exxon made several motions for summary judgment on the various
Kellogg claims and issues involved in this case. Such motions on the part of
Exxon included a motion summary judgment on Kellogg's claim for actual and
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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A. Laches
Exxon moved for summary judgment dismissing all of Kellogg's
claims due to acquiescence and subsequent laches 8 Acquiescence
is established if the evidence shows that the plaintiff was in fact
aware of the defendant's use of the trademark, and the plaintiff
made a deliberate decision not to challenge the use of the
trademark.49 Exxon argues acquiescence may be based on
evidence that the plaintiff was aware of defendant's use and
engaged in acts which suggested that the plaintiff did not object to
that use."
Exxon argues laches does require proof of intentional delay, but
it is enough if the plaintiff has negligently failed to assert its
1
trademark rights against the defendant.
Exxon notes laches
2
delay.
unreasonable
of
consists
1. Length of Delay •
For laches purposes, delay is calculated from the time plaintiff
first knew, or should have known of a potentially infringing
mark. 3 Exxon admits although laches is generally premised on a
plaintiffs negligent delay in asserting its rights, some courts have
held that delay alone may not be sufficient to bar all relief in

punitive damages, a summary judgment motion dismissing Kellogg's federal
dilution claim, a summary judgment motion on the issue of bad faith, a motion
for summary judgment dismissing Kellogg's tarnishment claims, and a summary
judgment motion on Kellogg's state dilution claim.
48. Exxon's Memorandum of Law In Support of Its Motion For Summary
Judgment of Acquiescence and Laches at 1, Kellogg Company v. Exxon
Corporation, No. 96-3070 G/A (W.D.Tenn. Aug. 31, 1998)
49. Defendant's Memorandum at 5, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
50. Id. Exxon cites Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found v. Cromwell, 733
S.W.2d 89, 100-01 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) for the above proposition. This case
involved a not-for-profit corporation that used Elvis Presley's name in its
corporate name that brought action to dissolve another not-for-profit corporation
using Presley's name in its corporate name and also to prevent that corporation
from using Presley's name.
51. Defendant's Memorandum at 5, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 6.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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trademark cases.54 However, where a defendant relied to his own
detriment as a result of the plaintiffs delay, laches provides a
complete defense.5 Exxon's examples of detrimental reliance
include continuing to invest time and money to build good will in a
trademark. 6
Exxon argues that as a result of Kellogg's
unreasonable delay in bringing this action, Kellogg's acts and
statements led Exxon to rely on Kellogg's inaction and prejudiced
Exxon, alleging therefore, that "Kellogg is guilty of both laches
and acquiescence."57
Exxon further claims there is a strong presumption of laches in
this case because Kellogg unreasonably delayed more than three
years before bringing this lawsuit. 8 The Sixth Circuit found a
presumption that laches will parallel the analogous state statute of
limitations in Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc. 9 The Tandy
court held the statute of limitations applicable to analogous actions
at law is used to create a presumption of laches and this principle
presumes that an action is barred if not brought within the period
of the statute of limitations and is alive if brought within that
period.' The statute of limitations in Tennessee is three years.
Exxon notes that a presumption of laches is not easily overcome,
and the presumption may be rebutted only by pointing to
"extraordinary circumstances or unusual conditions" that justify a
plaintiff's delay.62
Exxon argues the Tandy decision is dispositive in this case
because Kellogg delayed well beyond the three years necessary to
create a strong presumption of laches, without giving any
compelling reasons to rebut the presumption of laches. 63 Exxon
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Defendant's Memorandum at 6, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362 (6th. Cir.
1985) (Defendant in a trademark infringement action moved for summary
judgment on the basis of the equitable defense of laches.)
60. Tandy, 769 F.2d at 365-66.
61. Defendant's Memorandum at 7, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
62. Id.
Id.
Published63.
by Digital
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insists the Tandy rule places the burden on Kellogg to explain why
they grossly delayed in bringing the lawsuit, and unless Kellogg
can overcome this presumption, the court does not need to evaluate
the other issues presented by Exxon's motion such as the prejudice
to Exxon and Kellogg's acquiescence.'
Exxon argues that that Kellogg's delay should be measured from
the 1960's when Kellogg admits that it was first aware of Exxon's
use of the cartoon tiger at that point in time.6" Kellogg also had
constructive knowledge of Exxon's 1965 trademark registration
and the renewal of the registration in 1985.66 As a result, Exxon
claims that the delay in this case was over thirty years.67 Exxon
asserts that even if Kellogg's delay is only measured from
November of 1992, when Exxon sent Kellogg the example of uses
of its cartoon tiger in the United States, the Tandy presumption
would still control.68 Kellogg made a conscious "tactical legal
decision" to delay from November 1992 to October 1996, and they
cannot overcome the strong presumption of laches which
resulted.69 In fact, Exxon asserts since Kellogg deliberately
decided to delay for almost four years with knowledge of Exxon's
substantial use of the cartoon tiger trademark, it constitutes a
compelling reason to apply the Tandy presumption.70

64. Id. Exxon cites Construction Tech v. Lockformer Co., 704 F. Supp.
1212, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) which holds that an action was dismissed because
the plaintiff delayed longer than the statute of limitations period and also did not
offer any evidence that the defendants were not prejudiced by the intolerable
delay. Construction Tech involved a situation where a automated heating
system process designer sued competitors for unfair competition, false
advertising, deceptive practices, misappropriation of technology, inducing
breach of contract, interference with advantageous business relations,
conspiracy, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.
65. Defendant'sMemorandum at 8 Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Defendant'sMemorandum at 8, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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2. Kellogg's Knowledge
Exxon argues the Tandy presumption of laches also arises due to
Kellogg's knowledge that Exxon used its cartoon tiger in
connection with convenience stores, because Kellogg knew or
should have known of Exxon's use the cartoon tiger in such a
manner more than three year before this suit was filed.71 Exxon
claims Kellogg knew of its use of the cartoon tiger in connection
with convenience stores." The knowledge of Kellogg's sales force
is imputed to Kellogg, because Kellogg expected its sales force to
report trademark infiingement problems back to Kellogg's legal
department.7
Exxon believes the evidence shows some of
Kellogg's sales representatives were aware of Exxon's use of its
cartoon tiger at Exxon's convenience stores because during the
period from 1991-1993, these representatives bought gas at Exxon
stations. 4
Exxon argues Kellogg should be charged with knowledge of
Exxon's use of the "Whimsical Tiger" in connection with
convenient stores because such use would have been easy to
discover prior to October 1993 because Kellogg was aware of
sufficient facts by that time to put them on inquiry notice.7' A
reasonable party would have investigated Exxon's use of the
cartoon tiger based on the information known to Kellogg prior to
1993 and Kellogg was also aware of numerous uses of Exxon's
cartoon tiger in the United States as a result of Exxon's 1992
letter.76 In addition, Exxon states that Kellogg knew Exxon had
convenience stores in the United States prior to October 1993 and
even Kellogg's in-house trademark counsel knew Exxon affiliates
in Canada and Argentina were using the cartoon tiger in connection
with convenience stores.77 Exxon argues that these facts adequate
to put Kellogg on notice prior to 1993 because any reasonable
investigation by that time would have shown Exxon's substantial
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 8-9.
75. Defendant's Memorandum at 9, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
76. Id.
Published77.
by Id.
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use of its cartoon tiger in connection with convenience stores."
Therefore, Kellogg at least had constructive knowledge of such
use.

79

3. Prejudice
Exxon also argued Kellogg's delay in bringing a trademark
infringement claim, either from 1964 or 1992, has caused
enormous prejudice to Exxon.8" During Kellogg's delay, Exxon
continued to heavily invest time and money in its efforts to build
public recognition and goodwill in its cartoon tiger mark." If
Kellogg were granted injunctive relief prohibiting Exxon from
using its cartoon tiger, Exxon will lose the goodwill it has worked
so hard to develop.82 Exxon will not only lose over thirty years of
time that could have been spent developing and promoting a new
trademark, but Exxon would also lose its entire investment of
resources in its cartoon tiger." Exxon cites NAACP v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Education Fund,84 which recognized that lost
goodwill developed during the plaintiffs delay constitutes
prejudice that can be significant enough to bar all relief." Exxon
asserts that is has developed substantial goodwill in its cartoon
tiger trademark during the thirty-two years Kellogg waited to bring
this suit.86
Exxon argues its use of the cartoon tiger since 1991 has been
extensive and widespread.87 Exxon submitted into evidence a
multitude of newspaper and magazine articles that demonstrate
their cartoon tiger has become strongly identified with the Exxon
78. Id.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Defendant'sMemorandum at 10, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 10.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 753 F.2d 131
(D.C. Cir. 1985). In this case, a civil rights organization brought action the legal
defense fund, a former affiliate, seeking an injunction preventing the legal fund
from using the initials NAACP of the organization as part of its title.
85. Defendant'sMemorandum at 10-11, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 12.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
10

Parrino: Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation: Was Kellogg Sleeping on Its

1998]

KELLOGG V EXXON

name."5 Exxon lists examples of its use of the cartoon tiger since
1991: "Win With The Tiger" and "Save With The Tiger"
promotions in the summer of 1991;' 9 promotions in point-of-sale
materials; a quarterly newsletter called Tiger Talk distributed to
approximately $3,000,000 Exxon credit card holders nationwide;
regional and national promotions since 1991; exterior signs at
Tiger Mart convenience stores displaying the cartoon tiger";
fountain cups with the display of the cartoon tiger; and canopies
and roofs at many Exxon stations displaying the cartoon tiger.91 If
the court were to grant the injunctive relief that Kellogg seeks,
Exxon would have to change the various uses of the cartoon tiger
resulting in extreme prejudice caused by Kellogg's delay.92 Not
only would such steps be costly and burdensome, but would
greatly add to the severe prejudice resulting from the lost goodwill
in Exxon's tiger mark. 93 Exxon also contends that important
evidence has been lost as a result of Kellogg's delay.94
B. Acquiescence
In addition to laches, Exxon argues that Kellogg's conduct
constitutes acquiescence.95 That is, Kellogg's delay in bringing
this suit was intentional and deliberate because Kellogg was indeed
aware of Exxon's use of its cartoon tiger in the "Put a Tiger in
88. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 3-4.
89. These promotions were supported by a 3-week television campaign,
newspaper adds, and point-of-sale materials. In addition, Exxon spent over
$2,000,000 airing television ads and commercials and over $80,000 on
newspaper ads for these promotions. Defendant's Memorandum at 12, Kellogg,
No. 96-3070 G/A.
90. Exxon had opened at least 74 Tiger Mart convenience stores prior to
October 1993, and by the time Kellogg filed this lawsuit in October 1996, 270
convenient stores were opened. Defendant's Memorandum at 8, Kellogg, No.
96-3070 G/A.
91. Defendant's Memorandum at 12-13, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
92. Id. at 13-14.
93. Id.
94. Exxon cites Jabbar-El v. Sullivan, 811 F. Supp. 265, 272 (E.D. Mich.
1992) the "unavailability of the witnesses, the destruction of records, and the
absence of contemporaneous evidence are clearly prejudicial.
Published95.
by Defendant's
Digital Commons@DePaul,
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Your Tank" campaign during the961960's and Kellogg took no steps
whatsoever to challenge that use.
In August, 1968, Kellogg acknowledged that Kellogg's Tony the
Tiger peacefully existed with the Exxon tiger for many years in the
United States. 7 Kellogg's letter was written to persuade Exxon
not to oppose Kellogg's application to register Tony the Tiger in
Germany.9" Exxon did not oppose the application for registration,
and argues that Kellogg should be estopped from changing its
position now. 99 Also, in 1972 Kellogg indicated to Exxon that it
was not prepared to dispute an Exxon commercial featuring
Exxon's tiger in a format similar to a Kellogg Tony the Tiger
commercial." °° Exxon relied on this representation as an assurance
that Kellogg would not assert any trademark rights against
Exxon.10' In essence, reasonably concluding Kellogg's position of
acquiescence. 11 2 Exxon contends that at no time did Kellogg object
to any of Exxon's uses of its cartoon tiger, and when Kellogg
received examples of Exxon's numerous uses of the "Whimsical
Tiger", Kellogg waited almost four years before filing suit. 3
Kellogg admitted in a deposition that the delay was a "tactical legal
decision."'"
Intentional delay constitutes acquiescence which
should bar Kellogg's claims for relief' 0 '
Exxon is confident that Kellogg's laches alone should bar all
relief in this case.1" 6 However, some decisions have suggested that
laches alone may not be sufficient to bar injunctive relief in a
trademark case. 0 7 Regardless of these suggestions, Exxon asserts
Kellogg has committed sufficient affirmative acts of acquiescence

96. Id. at 14.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Defendant'sMemorandum at 14, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Defendant'sMemorandum at 14, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 18.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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to bar all relief.' 8 Therefore, whether the court relies on Exxon's
laches defense or its acquiescence defense, Kellogg's claims
should be barred.'09
IIL Kellogg's Arguments
A. Laches
Kellogg asserts mere laches will not bar Kellogg's claim for
injunctive relief."0 Kellogg argues the Sixth Circuit is clear on the
issue that proof of laches is not sufficient to bar a party in a
trademark action from seeking an injunction."' Kellogg indicates
under Tandy, in order to deny injunctive relief in trademark
litigation, some affirmative conduct in the nature of an estoppel or
conduct amounting to virtual abandonment is necessary.'
Alternatively, Kellogg argues summary judgment on Exxon's
laches defense should be denied on the merits.13 Kellogg argues
Exxon's initial use of the cartoon tiger was for motor fuels only
and that during the period from 1964-1968, Exxon advertised and
promoted its high octane gasoline with the cartoon tiger and the
slogan "Put A Tiger In Your Tank."1 4 Kellogg contends that with
little impetus to expand gasoline consumption during the energy
shortage years of the seventies and early eighties, Exxon's tiger
saw little usage and in 1982, Exxon abandoned the cartoon tiger
and replaced it with a live tiger."' Kellogg maintains that in 1991,
Exxon resumed use and for the first time expanded use of the
cartoon tiger on a very limited basis to convenience food stores and
food/beverage products." 6
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Kellogg Company's Memorandum of Facts and Law in Opposition To
Exxon's Motion For Summary Judgment of Acquiescence and Laches, at 3,
Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation, No. 96-3070 G/A (W.D. Tenn. Aug.

31, 1998).
111. Id.
112. Plaintiffs Memorandum at 3-4, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
113. Id.at4.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id.
Plaintiff's
Memorandum at 2016
5, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
Published116.
by Digital
Commons@DePaul,

13

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

118

DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. IX: 105

1. Length OfDelay
Kellogg argues that triable issues of fact exist as to Exxon's
expanded use of the cartoon tiger for convenience food stores and
food and beverage products. 1 7 Kellogg cites SCI Systems, Inc. v.
Solidstate Controls, Inc."' to support the rule that laches requires
proof of an unreasonable delay in enforcing one's rights which
materially prejudices the alleged infringer." 9 Kellogg claims that
under certain circumstances, the laches period is subject to
equitable tolling, and thus if Kellogg brought action on a claim
within three years, plus any tolling period, of the date of the claim
matured, then the claim is presumptively not barred by laches. 2 °
Kellogg claims laches should not necessarily be measured from
defendant's very first use of the contested mark, but from the date
the defendant's acts have first significantly impacted on plaintiffs
goodwill and business reputation.' Kellogg cites JohannaFarms,
Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., to assert a party cannot be guilty of
laches until his or her right "ripens into one entitled to
protection."'2
Kellogg states this concept is known as
24
"progressive encroachment" and is applied in the Sixth Circuit.
Kellogg indicates that Exxon argues it has been using its cartoon
tiger since 1964, but Kellogg argues its use was is connection with
motor fuels and the "Whimsical Tiger" used in connection with
motor fuels, was a cartoon tiger of a different personality and
image.22 Kellogg's complaint challenges Exxon's expansion of
the cartoon tiger use to convenience food stores and food/beverage
products. 26 Kellogg maintains that this distinct use of the cartoon
117. Id.at 6.
118. SCI Systems, Inc. v. Solidstate Controls, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1257, 1261
(S.D. Ohio 1990). In this case, a trademark owner brought trademark
infringement action of the trademark "SCI."
119. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 5, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
120. Id. at 6-7.
121. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 7, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
122. Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 881
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
123. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 7, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id. at 7-8.
126. Id. at 8.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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tiger, which is closer in category to Kellogg's Tony the Tiger
mark, is more likely to result in consumer confusion, and is not
barred by laches even if Exxon establishes continuous use of their
cartoon tiger for motor fuels and other products.127
In Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,' the court held the
plaintiff's delay in filing suit of up to twelve years did not result in
laches because the defendant recently moved its mark from upscale
department stores into the plaintiffs market of food, drug, and
mass merchandiser stores. 9 Kellogg argues that even if laches
affected their challenge to Exxon's use of the "Whimsical Tiger"
for motor fuels and other products, this would have no impact on
Kellogg's challenge to Exxon's expansion of the use of the cartoon
tiger to convenience stores, food, and beverage products. 3 °
2. Kellogg's Knowledge
Exxon points to various alleged uses of the cartoon tiger that
should have put Kellogg on notice that Exxon's mark was being
expanded to use in conjunction with convenience food stores.'
Kellogg finds Exxon's examples: decals on convenience stores;
use on fountain cups; use in 1992 "Save With The Tiger"
promotion; a joint promotion with Subway stores; and certain uses
in Tiger Mart stores that commenced in 1991 to be without
merit.'32 Kellogg asserts that none of the above uses were
disclosed to Kellogg's counsel when it discussed infringing uses of
the cartoon tiger with Exxon's counsel in November 1992.13 Each
will be discussed in turn below.

127. Id.
128. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp, 81 F.3d 455, 461-62 (4th Cir.
1996). In this case, the manufacturer of hosiery bearing "L'eggs" trademark
brought an action against competitor which marketed "Leg Looks" brand of
hoisery alleging trademark infringement and other state related claims.
129. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 8, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
130. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 8-9, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
131. Id. at9.
132. Id.
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a. Decals
The decals contained a small depiction of the cartoon tiger on
approximately 19 of its Exxon Shop convenience stores."'
Kellogg contends this minimal use of the mark does not constitute
bona fide commercial use in connection with convenience food
stores for several reasons including, the decal was only seven
inches in height, the record reflects it was posted at 19 convenience
stores (primarily in the Baton Rouge and Nashville areas) and it
was not used as a source identifier."'
b. FountainCup
Kellogg maintains that Exxon's documentation of this cartoon
tiger use on fountain cups is questionable for several reasons.'36
First, Kellogg argues Exxon has not provided any documents
which corroborate its sale of found cups bearing the cartoon tiger
decal; second, there exists no indication of the use of the cartoon
tiger on cups or any related point-of-sale materials in Exxon's
catalogs of advertising and promotional materials for this time
period; third, there is nothing in the record as to the extent of sales
under these cups or even the geographic distribution of sales.' 37
c. Save With The Tiger
Kellogg indicates that Exxon alleges the use of the cartoon tiger
in connection with a Save With The Tiger promotion in 1992.13
Kellogg maintains however, the promotion was for "Phase IV
Gasoline" and not directly for food/beverage products. 3 9
d. Subway Joint Promotion
Kellogg argues Exxon's use of its cartoon tiger in conjunction
with a joint promotion with "Subway" Sandwich shops in 1992,
was minimal. 4 ° The promotion ran for a limited period of time at

134. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 10, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 11, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
140. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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only 40-50 Exxon stations limited to Phoenix, Arizona.14 1
Therefore, the cartoon tiger was not used as a source identifier for
the sandwich. 42
e. Tiger Mart Uses
Kellogg claims Exxon failed to include examples of Tiger Mart
uses of the cartoon tiger when it provided Kellogg with current
uses of the cartoon tiger in November of 1992.143 In fact, Kellogg
alleges Exxon did not provide Kellogg with current uses of the
cartoon tiger in November 1992.'4
f The 1992 Communications
On November 3, 1992, Kellogg objected to Exxon's new uses of
the cartoon tiger in Canada and Argentina. 4 During a telephone
conversation, Exxon's counsel allegedly told Kellogg Exxon was
using the cartoon tiger in the United States, and Kellogg
challenged this allegation. 4 6 Instead, Kellogg maintains there was
no mention by Exxon that the cartoon tiger was used with respect
to convenience food stores or related food/beverage products.' 47 At
the end of the conversation, Kellogg asserts that Exxon's counsel
agreed to provide Kellogg with examples of current uses of the
cartoon tiger in the United States. 48 Exxon responded in a letter
dated November 20, 1992 with examples of current uses of the
cartoon tiger.1 49 Bob Rippe, Exxon's counsel mentioned in the
letter he was "mystified" about Kellogg's concern in light of the
"different goods and services with which the party's marks are
used."15 Kellogg argues Mr. Rippe failed to include examples of
the tiger's current uses in connection with Tiger Mart convenience
food stores, or related food/beverage items.'
Kellogg asserts
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 12.
144. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 10-12, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
145. Id. at 12.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 12, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
150. Id.
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Exxon's new area of use for their mark, is closely related to
Kellogg's use of the "Tony the Tiger" design, and Exxon knew if it
disclosed such use of its cartoon tiger in connection with
convenience food stores, and related food/beverage items, Kellogg
would have immediately filed an action." 2
3. UncleanHands
Kellogg further argues Exxon never corrected the calculated
omissions it committed in 1992 in any subsequent interactions with
Kellogg and Exxon engaged in additional promotions using the
cartoon tiger for convenience food stores before October 1993."3
Therefore, Exxon should not be allowed to benefit from
intentionally misleading omissions. 4 Kellogg argues the laches
defense can only be raised by one who comes into equity with
clean hands. 5
In response to Exxon's prejudice argument,
Kellogg asserts had Exxon informed Kellogg of their actual and
intended use of the cartoon tiger for convenience stores and
food/beverage products in November 1992, then Kellogg would
have filed suit before Exxon opened 270 stores. 6 Due to Exxon's
intentionally misleading omissions, Kellogg was not aware of their
usage until 1995 and was not aware the widespread extent of such
convenient store use of the cartoon tiger until after the lawsuit was
filed. 157 Also, Kellogg argues that on March 26, 1996, Exxon's
application to register its cartoon tiger for food, restaurant, and
convenience store services at gasoline stations was published for
opposition."'

152. Id. at 13.
153. Id.
154. Plaintif's Memorandum at 13, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.A party
claiming the benefit of an equitable estoppel must have proceeded with the
utmost good faith. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Elvisly Yours. Inc., 936
F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991). In this case, suit was brought alleging trademark
infringement and violations of Tennessee common law and statutory rights of
publicity.
155. United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 1979).
156. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 14, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
157. Id.
158. Idat 14-15.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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Kellogg urges the court to find Exxon's progressive
encroachment into convenience food stores and food/beverage
products matured well after October 7, 1993, and the publication
for opposition of Exxon's trademark application to register the
cartoon tiger for convenience food stores in 1996, was the
culminating event in Exxon's progressive encroachment." 9
Kellogg's opposition to Exxon's application was sufficiently
timely, and this suit filed promptly.' Kellogg asserts its challenge
to Exxon's expansion to convenience food stores and
food/beverage products is valid, and Exxon has failed to meet its
burden to support summary judgment of its laches defense. 6 '
If the court is not persuaded that there is a material issue of fact
as to whether Exxon's progressive encroachment matured within
the laches safehaven, then the court must determine the date of
Kellogg's knowledge of Exxon's uses of the "Whimsical Tiger"
for convenience food stores and food/beverage products.'6 2
Kellogg finds Exxon's case authority in support of its contention
that delay for the purposes of laches is measured from the time
Kellogg "knew or should have known" of Exxon's use if its
cartoon tiger, is unpersuasive. 6 ' Exxon cites three cases in support
of its "should have known" proposition."6
159. Id.at 15.
160. Id.
161. Plaintif's Memorandum at 15, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A. Kellogg
also argues alternatively that triable issues exist as to whether Kellogg had
actual or constructive notice of Exxon's use of the cartoon tiger prior to 1995.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 15-16.
164. Kellogg argues in Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., Inc., 693
F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1982) the court found the plaintiff should have
known of the defendant's use of a similar mark because the plaintiff admitted it
was aware of the defendant's use in the local phone pages. Plaintiff's
Memorandum at 16, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A. In Piper Aircraft Corp. v.
Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1984), the defendant started an
aircraft parts business in 1960, and started selling airplane kits with the
infringing mark in 1973. The defendant first wrote to the plaintiff in 1974 about
his intent to build a replica of the plaintiffs product wrote again in 1975 to
communicate it would be building a replica of the plaintiffs aircraft with the
infringing mark. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 16, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
The court did not inquire into what the plaintiff should have known of the
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Kellogg claims Exxon's attempted application of the "should
have known" standard with its motion for summary judgment
stretches the doctrine well beyond its limits.165 Kellogg continues
to argue that two facts weigh heavily against Exxon's reliance on
such assumed knowledge here. 66 First, the primary manner in
which trademark holders put others on notice of their assertion of
rights is through an application to register the mark at issue, which
is then published for opposition.' 67 In this situation, Exxon
explicitly considered filing for service mark registration when it
resumed use of the cartoon tiger, but then ultimately decided
against such action because presumably Exxon had recognized that
16
such an application would have been opposed by Kellogg. 1
Kellogg further maintains that when Exxon finally did seek to
register the mark for the expanded use, Kellogg filed a timely
opposition and then filed suit.'69
Second, Kellogg asserts Exxon affirmatively misled Kellogg in
November 1992, regarding Exxon's use of the cartoon tiger in
connection with convenience food stores and food and beverage
products.' 7 ° To imply knowledge where Exxon had ample
opportunity to put Kellogg on actual notice and chose not to do so,
would create a substantial injustice.'
Kellogg does not have a
close relationship with Exxon which would result in constructive
knowledge of Exxon's expanded use of its cartoon tiger into
defendant's activities in a small, related market from 1960 until October 1974.
Id. Kellogg points out that the Piper Aircraft court down played the early
correspondence and held that the early letters "arguably did not demonstrate the
extent of defendant's objectionable activities." Id. Finally, in response to
McDonald v. Robertson, 104 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1939) which involved an
embezzlement claim on behalf of an employer, against an employee, in a small
business is different than the present trademark dispute between two large
companies, because they are not in the same close relationship. Plaintif's
Memorandum at 16, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
165. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 16, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
166. Id. at 16-17.
167. Id. at 17.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 17.
170. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 17, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
171. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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convenience food marts and Exxon only engaged in limited uses of
the cartoon tiger for convenience food stores and food/beverage
products before October 1993.172
Kellogg claims it was not actually aware of Exxon's expanded
use of the "Whimsical Tiger" into convenience stores until 1995
when David Herdman, Kellogg's trademark attorney, learned of
the expanded use. 73
Kellogg explains that after the
communications in November 1992, Mr. Herdman was under the
impression that Exxon was not using the cartoon tiger for
convenience food stores or food/beverage products in the United
States. 74 Furthermore, when Mr. Herdman contacted Kellogg's
sales force worldwide to request examples of current uses of the
cartoon tiger, no samples of the use in connection with
convenience food stores in the United States were provided. 7
Kellogg asserts the court should deny Exxon's motion for
summary judgment of its laches because Kellogg did not have
knowledge of Exxon's expanded use until 1995, within the three76
year limitations period.
In response to Exxon's contention that Kellogg is charged with
the knowledge of its sales force, Kellogg replies that in the
trademark context, courts generally hold that a large corporation is
not charged with the knowledge of its lower echelon employees.'77
A large corporation with many employees who have no role in
trademark enforcement is not charged with the employees'
knowledge of the defendant's trademark infringement, even if the
defendant's products were observed at industry trade shows or in
brochures.7 7
Kellogg's sales force was not responsible for
enforcing its trademarks or even reporting potential trademark
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 18, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 18-19.
178. Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor Co., 698 F. Supp. 199, 203
(C.D. Cal. 1988). In this case, an automobile accessories manufacturer sought
declaratory judgment concerning rights to use an the automobile manufacturer's
trademarks.
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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infringements.' 79 In addition, Kellogg contends their sales force
did not make sales calls to Exxon's convenience food stores which
displayed the cartoon tiger during the relevant time period. 8 '
Members of Kellogg's sales force were deposed by Exxon and had
only vague recollections of Exxon's use of the mark, often could
not identify whether they saw it before October 7, 1993, and could
not even recall visiting any of Exxon's convenient food stores.'
Kellogg explains these limited recollections of the sales force,
which were not reported to Kellogg's headquarters or anyone in
charge of trademarks, should not be imputed to Kellogg on the
issue of laches."' Kellogg argues that at the very least, there are no
genuine issues as to the material facts related to this issue." 3
4. Delay
Kellogg claims any laches period tolled until the filing of this
suit.'8 4 Kellogg filed its complaint on October 7, 1996, and for the
purposes of Exxon's motion for summary judgment, Exxon claims
that the relevant laches starting date is October 7, 1993.185 Kellogg
asserts two factors belie this contention. 8 6 First, the "delay in
filing suit for infringement will not count towards laches if during
that time the parties engaged in good faith settlement
negotiations."' 817
Kellogg attempted to achieve a "global
settlement" with Exxon in its discussions of the Canadian action
which included Exxon's use of the cartoon tiger in the United
States.'88 Kellogg argues that settlement discussions before and
after the filing of that suit went on for twenty-six months and
should not be counted toward the laches period. 9 Secondly,
179. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 20-21, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.

180. Id. at21.
181. Id.
182. Id.

183. Id.
184. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 21, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. Kellogg cites PiperAircraft, 741 F.2d at 932, which holds that three
and a half years of settlement negotiations are not counted toward laches period.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 22, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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Kellogg argues that opposition to the registration of a mark tolls
the laches period.19 In sum, the laches period should be tolled for
at least thirty-one months and as a result, the laches safehaven
extends back to March of 1991.19
Kellogg concludes its argument against Exxon's motion for
summary judgment on laches by arguing that as it relates to
Exxon's expanded use of the cartoon tiger for convenience food
stores and food/beverage products, the court has mentioned
independent bases for denying the motion.19
5. Prejudice
Kellogg contends Exxon failed to demonstrate any substantial
prejudice flowing from Kellogg's alleged delay. 9 Kellogg
asserted that apart from the "Put A Tiger In Your Tank" campaign
from 1964-1966 and the Exxon name change campaign from 19721973, Exxon's advertising and promotion of the cartoon tiger from
94
1967-179 was minimal, and from 1980-1991 it was non-existent.1
Kellogg argues Exxon provides no information on its expenditures
related to the cartoon tiger for any given time period, and nowhere
on the record can the court determine the extent of the Exxon's
expenditures since 1991 for either motor fuel use or in connection
with convenience food stores.' 9 Kellogg asserts that whatever the
amount spent by Exxon is dwarfed by over $100 billion dollars in
annual sales that Exxon obtains. 9 6 Expenditures promoting the
infringing mark will not be considered prejudice, particularly
where the defendant has been put on notice of the plaintiffs
objection. 97 In this case Kellogg's objection indisputably occurred
190. Kellogg cites Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus, 836 F. Supp. 200, 220
(D.N.J. 1993) for support.
191. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 23, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A. It should
also be noted that Kellogg explains that the laches safehaven extends back to
March of 1991 because of the 36 month Tandy presumption plus 31 month

tolling.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.

196. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 29, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
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here in November 1992, and followed with the Canadian
proceedings and attempts at a global settlement.'98
Kellogg replies to Exxon's allegation that prejudice also
occurred due to the loss of evidence (i.e. loss of recollection by
witnesses and destruction of a small number of documents).'99
Exxon points to events occurring in 1972, but does not assert such
evidence was lost during the period of Kellogg's delay between
November 1992 and October of 1996, when this suit was filed.2°
Kellogg also asserts evidence which points to various facts relating
to Exxon's laches defense such as failure of Kellogg sales
representatives to remember whether they drove past Tiger Mart
stores during 1991-1993, is irrelevant because it cannot be imputed
20
to Kellogg. '
As to Exxon's allegation that valuable documents were
destroyed such as its own destruction of photographs showing
cartoon tiger use on pump panels, Kellogg argues this evidence
was destroyed after Kellogg put Exxon on notice it believed that
the cartoon tiger had been abandoned in November 1992.202 Also,
Kellogg asserts the lost evidence referred to by Exxon is tangential
to the case and largely redundant, so in balancing the laches harm,
the court should find there is a material issue of fact as to whether
Exxon suffered harm as a result of Kellogg's alleged delay.0 3
B. Acquiescence
Kellogg argues that triable issues exist as to Exxon's
acquiescence defense. 2 4 Kellogg maintains that mere silence is not
sufficient to support Exxon's affirmative defense of acquiescence
and in this case, Exxon has not alleged or provided factual support
for an allegation of bad faith silence.2 5 Even if Kellogg was found
to be silent in light of Exxon's use, the facts presented are not

198. Id.
199. Id. at29.
200. Id. at 30.
201. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 30, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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sufficient to support a verdict for Exxon. °6 Kellogg contends
acquiescence is an intentional act. It requires proof of affirmative
conduct by Kellogg indicating it would not challenge Exxon's
other uses of the cartoon tiger in the United States, and that
Kellogg did not represent to Exxon that it would not enforce its
"Tony The Tiger" mark.20 7 Therefore, the undisputed facts do not
support Exxon's affirmative defense of acquiescence.0 '
According to Kellogg, Exxon has failed to show that Kellogg
said it would not challenge expansion of use of the cartoon tiger
for convenience food stores and food/beverage products. 9 When
Exxon first expanded its use of the cartoon tiger on a very limited
basis to convenience food stores in 1991, Kellogg did not engage
in any affirmative acts indicating it would not challenge Exxon's
expanded use, and Exxon has not alleged otherwise." 0 Kellogg
argues neither of the incidents which Exxon relies upon relate in
any manner to acquiescence on the part of Kellogg to Exxon's
expansion of the cartoon tiger use to convenience stores.211 As a
result, the court should deny Exxon's motion for summary
judgment of its acquiescence defense as it relates to Kellogg's
challenge to Exxon's expanded use of the cartoon tiger in the
convenience store arena.'
Exxon claims to have numerous uses
of the cartoon tiger in connection with its convenience stores, but
Exxon failed to mention such uses in its communication to Kellogg
of current uses.'
Kellogg argues, given Exxon's intentionally
misleading omissions, Exxon should be barred from asserting
equitable defenses in any respect.2" 4 Kellogg cites Thropp v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.,"' where the court found a defendant

206. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 31, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 33.
210. Id.
211. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 33, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 34
214. Id. at 34.
215. Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 823 (6th
Cir. by
1981).
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"cannot claim the plaintiffs
delay was unreasonable in light of the
216
evasion.,
own
defendant's
Kellogg also argues when they first learned of Exxon's expanded
use of the cartoon tiger in 1995, they began an investigation of the
expanded use of the mark 217, and at no time did Kellogg represent
to Exxon it would not oppose the use of the cartoon tiger in
connection with convenience stores."'
In Kellogg's last portion of its brief, Kellogg argues it did not
indicate it would not object to Exxon's future use of the cartoon
tiger in 1972 when Exxon's advertising agency submitted a
proposed commercial using the cartoon tiger to Kellogg for
Kellogg's approval, and Kellogg objected to such use.2 19 Kellogg
responded in a letter to Exxon as follows:
"Kellogg Company has been on record for many
220
years as objecting to your clients use of the Esso
Tiger, because of its similarity to 'Tony the Tiger.' We
still find the use of the Esso Tiger objectionable, and feel
that its use in a commercial which is virtually identical
to a Kellogg commercial presently on the air would be
particularly confusing to the public.
We naturally have no basis for objection to your use
of the fonnat of this particular commercial, as we
believe the format to be in the public domain. We do
find the use of the Esso Tiger character objectionable,
however."221

216. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 34, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
217. Also, as mentioned in 1996, Exxon's application to register the cartoon
tiger for convenience food store services came up for opposition, and Kellogg in
fact filed a timely opposition and then promptly filed this suit. Plaintiff's
Memorandum at 35, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
218. Id. at 35.
219. Id.
220. In 1972, Exxon changed its name from "Esso" to Exxon.
221. Plaintif'sMemorandum at 38, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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Kellogg asserts that the above information was directly
communicated to Exxon.222 In response to Exxon's allegation that
during the time Kellogg objected to the commercial, it was not
prepared to go to court, the facts as presented by Exxon do not
amount to an affirmative representation that Kellogg would not
enforce its mark in the future.22 3 Kellogg asserts that Exxon's
contention is contradicted by the fact the after the 1972 letter,
Exxon never aired the commercial at issue, presumably in response
to Kellogg's objections. 224 Kellogg further argues Exxon indicated
to Kellogg that had they known about Kellogg's objection to the
commercial earlier, Exxon would have pulled the commercial
earlier as a courtesy to Kellogg. 22 Kellogg argues there is at
minimum, a material issue of fact as to acquiescence.226
IV Court'sAnalysis
The court granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment based
on acquiescence.227 Exxon's remaining motions for summary
judgment were found to be moot by the court.22 1 In its opinion, the
court examined Exxon's affirmative defenses of laches and
acquiescence and then turned to Kellogg's claims of
abandonment 229 and progressive encroachment.23 ° The court
explains that summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate if the pleadings,
222. Id.
223. Id. at 38-39.
224. Id. at 39.
225. Id.
226. Plaintiff'sMemorandum at 39, Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A.
227. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 27. The court also granted partial
summary judgment based on a finding that Exxon did not abandon its of the
cartoon tiger.
228. Id. at 28. The dismissal of Kellogg's action render the following
motions moot: Exxon's motion for partial summary judgment on Kellogg's
state dilution claim; Exxon's motion for partial summary judgment on Kellogg's
dilution by tamishment claims; Exxon's motion for partial summary judgment
on the issue of bad faith; and Exxon's motion for summary judgment on
Kellogg's federal dilution claim.
229. This note does not focus on the issue of abandonment, however, part IV
will briefly discuss Kellogg's abandonment claim.
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.23'
The law provides a plaintiff should bring suit as soon as the
plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known of the alleged
trademark infringement.232 Exxon invokes the doctrines of laches
and acquiescence to prohibit Kellogg's trademark infringement
claims against Exxon for its use of the "Whimsical Tiger"
generally, and in connection with Exxon's Tiger Mart and Tiger
Express stores.233
The court cites Induct-o-matic Corp. v.
Inductotherm Corp. 34 stating both laches and acquiescence require
proof that the party enforcing its trademark rights has unreasonably
delayed in pursuing the litigation, and the alleged infiinger has
been materially prejudiced by such delay.235 The court explains
that the doctrines differ in that acquiescence is the intentional
relinquishment of a party's trademark rights, whereas laches
constitutes a negligent and unintentional failure to protect
trademark rights.236 The court initially noted that laches, as utilized
by the Sixth Circuit, precludes a plaintiff from recovering damages
for trademark infringement that occurs prior to the filing of an
action, but it will not bar injunctive relief. Under Tandy23 7 "to
deny injunctive relief in trademark litigation, however, some
affirmative conduct in the nature of estoppel, or conduct
amounting to 'virtual abandonment' is necessary.""23 Therefore as
231. Id. Fed. R. Civ. 56(c). Also, the court explains that the movant bears
the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the nonexistence of any
genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence as well as all the inferences
drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Id. at 12.
232. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 13.
233. Id. at 13-14.
234. Induct-o-matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 367 (6th
Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir.
1979)).
235. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 14.
236. Id.
237. Tandy, 769 F.2d at 366 n.2.
238. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 15.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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a result of Kellogg withdrawing its claim for actual and punitive
damages, Exxon's affirmative defense of laches is inapplicable
here. 239 However, as to Kellogg's remaining claim for injunctive
relief, the evidence introduced by Exxon is compelling to support
its assertion of acquiescence by Kellogg.240
The court states acquiescence embraces several of the elements
of estoppel by requiring a finding of conduct on the plaintiffs part
that amounted to an assurance to the defendant, express or implied,
that plaintiff would not assert his trademark rights against the
defendant.'24 The court relies on the well-established holding in
SCP42 , where the court held the foreclosure of injunctive relief
demands a showing of more than mere silence on the part of a
plaintiff, but also the defendant must show that it had been mislead
by plaintiff through actual misrepresentations; affirmative acts of
misconduct, intentional misleading silence, or conduct amounting
to virtual abandonment of the trademark. 243 However, if a plaintiff
remains silent and refuses to facilitate the protection of its
trademark for a grossly extended period of time, this plaintiffs
silence may give rise to a finding that the plaintiff abandoned its
exclusive rights to that trademark. 2 "
If the owner of a tradename acquiesces so long in the
use of that name or in a name strikingly similar thereto
that the public has in general become aware of the
other's appropriation of that name and is therefore not
deceived, such owner may in a proper case be treated as
having abandoned his one-time property right in that
name.

24 5

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. SCI, 748 F. Supp. at 1262.
243. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 16.
244. Id.
245. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co., 175 F.2d 370, 374 (3rd
Cir. by
1949).
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The court addresses Exxon's acquiescence argument regarding
the fact that Kellogg has only voiced concerns about the
"Whimsical Tiger" on two occasions, both occurring in the
1970's.246 The court found Kellogg did not oppose Exxon's
registration of the "Whimsical Tiger" in connection with the sale
of motor fuel, nor did Kellogg, until recently, demand that Exxon
stop its use of the cartoon tiger.247
While a successful opposition only acts to prevent
registration and not use, as a practical matter, it puts the
defendant on notice that, at the least, the plaintiff is not
going to sleep on its rights, and indeed, in our view, goes
even further and puts defendant on notice that the opposer
2 48
also protests its use of the confusingly similar mark.
In other words, the court explains Kellogg has provided no
evidence to indicate that Exxon was put on notice of Kellogg's
2 49
strong disapproval of its general use of its cartoon tiger.
Although Kellogg concedes that it did voice its concerns to Exxon
in a conversation with Exxon's legal department in 1992, and
brought its trademark infringement actions against Exxon in
Canada and Argentina, these concerns fail to excuse the prior
absence of opposition to Exxon's use of the "Whimsical Tiger" in
the United States during the past three decades. ° The court
recognizes inexcusable delay alone is insufficient for acquiescence,
but Kellogg was "grossly remiss" in failing to assert its rights.2 1'
As to the second prong of the acquiescence defense,1 2 Exxon
argues it has been prejudiced by Kellogg's delay in filing this
present action.25 3 The court found Exxon acted in reliance on
246. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 17.
247. Id.
248. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 17.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 17-18.
251. Id. at 18.
252. The second prong of acquiescence is "prejudice" to the defending party.
253. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 18. Specifically, Exxon contends that it
has lost important documents and testimonial evidence essential to the 30
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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Kellogg's minimal and infrequent opposition to Exxon's use of the
cartoon tiger by spending millions of dollars promoting the image
and good will of its cartoon tiger." 4 In addition to the depth of
Exxon's investment in its cartoon tiger, magazine articles and
advertisement clippings and commercials featuring the cartoon
tiger that have spanned three decades, illustrate the strong public
2
connection between the Exxon name and the "Whimsical Tigere 11
The court finds Exxon's reliance on Kellogg's long periods of
silence resulted in clear prejudice to Exxon in Exxon's inability to
defend itself in this lawsuit and in connection to the financial
investments made in the cartoon tiger campaign. 6 Therefore, in a
light most favorable to Kellogg 7 on this motion for summary
judgment on the issue of acquiescence, Exxon has met its dual
burden of showing unreasonable delay and prejudice caused by
Kellogg and its failure to bring a suit in a timely manner, to such
an extent a reasonable trier of fact could not return a verdict for
Kellogg on this issue." 8 In rejecting Kellogg's abandonment
claim, the court held Exxon introduced evidence sufficient to show
a continuous bona fide use of its cartoon tiger from 1964 to the
present day and Kellogg cannot establish the nonuse element of the
abandonment claim as a matter of law. 25 9 As a result, the court
granted Exxon's motion for partial summary judgment on
Kellogg's abandonment claim.2"
disposition of the case. For example, Exxon assets that is has been unable to
provide photographic evidence of its use of the cartoon tiger in connection with
the sale of petroleum and other related products during the 1980's because the
photographic records of its Exxon's stations were destroyed in 1994. In
addition, certain important Exxon witnesses have retired.
254. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 19.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The non-moving party.
258. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 16.
259. Id. at 23.
260. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 23. The court indicated Kellogg has
asserted Exxon abandoned its cartoon tiger because Exxon failed to use it in a
bona fide manner such as for the sale of motor fuels during the 1970's and
1980's. However, the court reasons that Exxon has introduced ample evidence
that at the very least Exxon maintained fairly continuous use of the cartoon tiger
Published
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The court also addressed Kellogg's assertion of Exxon's
progressive encroachment. A finding for Kellogg on the issue of
progressive encroachment will prevent Exxon from its continued
use of the cartoon tiger in connection with its convenience food
stores.26'
The court states the doctrine of progressive
encroachment precludes the application of acquiescence because "a
course of progressive encroachment does not tend to arouse hostile
action until fully developed." 262 Kellogg argues Exxon has
changed its cartoon tiger's personality and image over time and
only recently expanded into the convenience food store market,
therefore Kellogg did not become fully aware of Exxon's
infringement until March of 1996.263 The court analyzes SCI
Systems, Inc. v. Solidstate Controls, Inc. 2 4 decision cited by
Kellogg. In SCI, the court explained, the plaintiff claimed
although it had been aware of the defendant's trademark
infringement since 1969, the defendant had only recently departed
from the business practices which had allowed the parties to coKellogg has admitted that they were aware of Exxon use of the cartoon tiger
with the Exxon name change campaign in the early 1970's and also Exxon has
submitted evidence that it featured the "Whimsical Tiger" in its national
"Energy for a Strong America" campaign in the late 1970's. Exxon's cartoon
tiger was used throughout the 70's and 80's prior to and during the
modernization program of Exxon's gasoline pumps as well as throughout the
80's the cartoon tiger was featured in various local and national advertising
campaigns, state fairs, promotional games, and a political convention. The court
finally states that in order to establish "nonuse" in satisfaction of an
abandonment claim, Kellogg must demonstrate that Exxon did not utilize the
trademark in a manner "sufficient to maintain the public's identification of the
mark with the proprietor." Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 21. The court cites
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Schick U.S.A., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 143 (D. Conn.
1996). Finally, the court indicates that the use must be bona fide, as opposed to
a sham use instituted soley for the purposes of maintaining trademark rights.
261. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 16 n.12.
262. Id. at 24; SCI Systems, Inc. v. Solidstate Controls, Inc., 748 F. Supp.
1257, 1263 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
263. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 23. The court also reiterates Kellogg's
claim that Exxon's entrance into the convenience food store industry places
Exxon's "Whimsical Tiger" in a venue where the threat of harm to Kellogg's
"Tony the Tiger" trademark and the likelihood of confusion between the two
cartoon tigers is substantially increased. Id. at 23-24.
264. SC, 748 F. Supp. at 1257.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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exist peaceably for many years, and that defendant only recently
encroached on plaintiffs rights. 265 The court notes, the plaintiff
did not perceive a trademark violation until the defendant had
registered a trademark bearing the same mark as the plaintiff and
entered into the data processing market of which only the plaintiff
had been a several-year member.2 66 The SCI court determined a
defense of laches can be defeated if changes in a mark over the
years and recent entry into the same marketing are occur.267
However, the judge held since Exxon does not compete directly
with or has not entered the same market area as Kellogg, Kellogg
is not in a position to claim progressive encroachment to defeat
Exxon's acquiescence claim.268
Kellogg's situation can be distinguished from SCI, where the
plaintiff was required to show not only a change in the defendant's
mark over time, but also that the defendant had recently entered
into the marketing area of the plaintiff.2 69 Furthermore, in
PrudentialIns. Co. v. GibralterFin. Corp,270 the 9th Circuit held a
plaintiff could not claim progressive encroachment where the
defendant did not move into direct competition with the plaintiff
and the parties did not offer the same services to any substantial
extent or where there is no evidence that actual confusion of their
services had occurred. 271 The court explicitly states that it is
critical that the similarity of the parties' product and use of the
same channels and markets to sell the product is established for a
finding of progressive encroachment.272
265. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 24. The parties in SCI were engaged
initially in related businesses; the plaintiff sold electrical supplies and related
products, and the defendant was a manufacturer and seller of electrical power
control equipment.
266. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 25.
267. Id.
268. Id.

269. Id.
270. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir.

1982).
271. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 25-26.
272. Id. at 26. Kellogg claims that Exxon's departure from the use of the
cartoon tiger in connection with motor fuel sales and eventual entrance into the
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Kellogg asserts that Exxon's convenience stores sell food and
beverage items, therefore Exxon has moved into direct competition
with Kellogg. 73 In response, the court reasoned that Kellogg is
traditionally and primarily a manufacturer of cereals, and although
Exxon has entered the convenience food market, Exxon has2 74not
become a manufacturer or distributor of food items.
Furthermore, Exxon is a retail convenience store in the business of
selling food on the premises of gasoline stations, whereas
Even though Exxon may sell
Kellogg's product is cereal."
Kellogg's cereal products in their convenience food stores, this fact
alone does not establish that the parties are competitors in the same
or even a related market. 276 The court recognizes if there is actual
confusion between Kellogg's and Exxon's cartoon tigers, the
connection between the products and marketing channels for the
sale of their products is too attenuated to support Kellogg in their
claim of progressive encroachment. 7 In sum, the court finds
Kellogg has failed to submit sufficient evidence of fact regarding
progressive encroachment to overcome the court's previous
holding of acquiescence as a matter of law.278
IMPACT

It is truly a shame that after three decades of peaceful
coexistence between Kellogg's "Tony the Tiger" and Exxon's
"Whimsical Tiger" that an alleged trademark infringement claim
has arisen. Certainly, both the legal community and society
respects and acknowledges the right to be free from others
infringing on valid trademark holders rights. Obviously, the whole
premise of holding and acquiring a trademark is to prevent such
infringements. I would imagine that the multitude of trademark
holders take solace in the fact that if a party's trademark is truly
infringed upon, the law will not tolerate or stand for such
infringement. However, we as members of society are provided
273. Id.
274. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 26-27.
275. Id. at 27.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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many rights, but these rights must be asserted in a timely fashion,
because for those that delay an unreasonably long period of time,
may relinquish that very right they were entitled to. After
reviewing all the essential facts and relevant case law in the area of
trademark infringement, the court in Kellogg Company v. Exxon
Corporation was correct in dismissing Kellogg's claim for
trademark infringement.
A. The Court Was CorrectIn GrantingExxon's Motion For
Summary Judgment Based On Acquiescence.
The court was correct in finding that since Kellogg had only
voiced its concerns about the shared use of the cartoon tiger on two
occasions occurring in the 1970's and Kellogg did not oppose
Exxon's registration of their cartoon tiger in connection with motor
fuel, because Exxon was not on notice of Kellogg's disapproval of
Exxon using its cartoon tiger. In fact, it was not until recently that
Kellogg demanded Exxon cease use of their cartoon tiger. The
court was correct in determining Kellogg acquiesced. In AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co. 2 79 , the court found the
plaintiffs failure to voice its disapproval of the defendant's
tradename over a thirty-one year period to be grossly remiss and
the plaintiff was estopped from asserting its trademark rights.
Similarly, the court was correct in dismissing Kellogg's claim after
thirty years. The court was also correct in deciding that Kellogg's
untimely expressions of concern in the 1990's and the legal actions
brought in 1992 for trademark infringement against Exxon in
Canada and Argentina fails to excuse Kellogg's prior absence of
opposition to the use of the "Whimsical Tiger" in the United
States. In United States Playing Card Company v. The Bicycle
Club,2 ° The United States Playing Card Company ("USPC")
which sold "Bicycle" brand playing cards, brought suit against a
card casino called "The Bicycle Club" to enjoin the casino's use of
its name on grounds of trademark dilution. USPC failed to bring
suit for nearly three years after the opening of the casino on
279. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co., 175 F.2d 370, 374 (3rd

Cir. 1949).
280. United States Playing Card Company v. The Bicycle Club., 119
Ohio.App.3d
695 N.E.2d 1197.2016
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November 30, 1984.28 ' In fact, USPC knew about the casino
before it even opened up, but never complained about its name
until the filing of the lawsuit on October 7, 1987.82 The court held
that USPC was estopped by laches and acquiescence.283
Just as USPC was estopped by laches and acquiescence from
bringing suit, the court in Kellogg correctly granted Exxon's
motion for summary judgment on acquiescence. The USPC court
found USPC's inaction was well beyond the analogous statute of
limitations, and constituted an unreasonable delay.
When
comparing USPC to Kellogg, it can be seen that Kellogg
unreasonably delayed for more than three years as well. Kellogg's
unreasonable delay of more than three years occurred regardless if
measured from the 1960's or November of 1992. An unreasonable
delay has occurred since the evidence suggests Kellogg made a
"tactical legal decision" to delay from November of 1992 until
October of 1996 when this suit was filed.
284 the
In Sara Lee Corporation v. Kayser-Roth Corporation,
plaintiff, was a manufacturer of hosiery bearing "L'eggs"
trademark, who brought action against a competitor which
marketed "Leg Looks" brand of hoisery. The defendant recently
moved its mark from upscale department stores into plaintiffs
market of food, drug, and mass merchandising stores.285 The court
held, Sara Lee Corporation did not acquiesce in the competitor's
use "Leg Looks" mark in food, drug, and mass merchandising
outlets.286 This case can be distinguished however from the
situation here in Kellogg. In Sara Lee, the court found the 1991
settlement agreement between the parties was intended only to
govern Sara Lee's future actions in marketing its lingerie "Looks"
brand and nothing in the agreement can reasonably be construed to
immunize the defendant from liability for all future infringing

281. United States Playing Card Co., 119 Ohio.App.3d at 604.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Sara Lee Corporation v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455 (4th Cir.
1996).
285. SaraLee Corp., 81 F. 3d at 461-462.
286. Id. at 455.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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uses. 287 In this case, Kellogg affirmatively acquiesced when
Kellogg did not object to Exxon's 1991 promotional campaigns
288
such as "Win With The Tiger" and "Save With The Tiger.
Certainly, it is not unreasonable for Exxon to expect that if Kellogg
had any objections to the "Whimsical Tiger," such objection would
have been an appropriate time to announce an objection. It was
reasonable for Exxon to believe Kellogg was actively consenting to
its use of the cartoon tiger.
289
In Harley-Davidson,Inc., v. Estate of DanielK. O'Connell, J.,
a seller of motorcycles under "Harley-Davidson" trademark
brought action against alleged infringers who used the name
"Harley Rendezvous" to refer to their motorcycle related events.
The court found among other things, the plaintiffs justifications2 90
for delay in filing suit could not excuse the full extent of the
delay.291 As far as Exxon's expansion into the convenience store
market is concerned, Kellogg had both substantial actual and
constructive knowledge of such expansion as to nullify and reasons
or excuses for unreasonable delay on the part of Kellogg. The
court in Kellogg was correct in refuting Kellogg's argument that
the examples of use of the "Whimsical Tiger" that Exxon provided
Exxon in 1992 were not sufficient to put Kellogg on notice of
287. Id. at 463.
288. Articles dealing with these promotional campaigns appeared in the
magazine AdWeek. Kellogg representatives and Kellogg's advertising agency,
Leo Burnett Company, subscribed to "AdWeek" in 1991.
289. Harley-Davidson, Inc., v. Estate of Daniel K. O'Connell, 1998 WL
344271 (N.D.N.Y.).

290. The plaintiff, Harley-Davidson's proffered justifications for delay
included:
1. Harley-Davidson had expressed some concern over confusion of
the respective marks by asking the defendant to note in their
advertising that the defendant had no connection to Harley-Davidson.
1998 WL 344271, 7 (N.D.N.Y.).
2. Harley-Davidson's attempt to negotiate a settlement.
3. Harley-Davidson's belief that the defendant's were no longer a
going concern was reasonable.
4. During the relevant period, the defendant Harley Rendezvous,
was involved in bankruptcy disputes, and that it stood at the brink of

financial ruin.
291.
Harley-Davidson, 1998 WL 344271 at 7.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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expansion into the convenient food store market is not a viable
excuse and reason for the unreasonable delay. If the court in
Harley-Davidson found the proffered justifications to be
insufficient to provide a viable excuse for delay, then Kellogg's
justification has no significant merit as well. The court in United
States Playing Card Co. indicated actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff is a requirement of the
equitable doctrine of laches 92 Exxon's use of the "Whimsical
Tiger" in connection with convenience food stores was
significantly prevalent to impute both actual -and constructive
knowledge on to Kellogg. As a result of Kellogg having both
actual and constructive knowledge, the court was correct in finding
that Kellogg unreasonably delayed in bringing the trademark
infringement action against Exxon.
The facts of this case also show Exxon was indeed prejudiced by
Kellogg's unreasonable delay in the filing of this present action.
The rule on acquiescence is quite clear that delay alone will not by
itself bar a plaintiffs suit, but also that the defendant has been
prejudiced by the plaintiffs delay.293 From the facts, there exists
no doubt the Exxon was most certainly prejudiced by Kellogg's
delay. The court is to be applauded for finding Exxon's prejudice.
Exxon has suffered serious economic prejudice by spending and
investing millions of dollars in promoting the "Whimsical Tiger"
over the last three decades. Just as the court in NAACP v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Education Fund 94 recognized, lost goodwill
developed during the plaintiffs delay constituted prejudice
significant enough to bar all relief, the court in Kellogg was correct
in deciding that economic prejudice has occurred from the millions
Exxon spent in promoting the goodwill of the "Whimsical Tiger"
in magazine articles and advertisements (both commercials and
clippings).
Certainly, over the last three decades, Exxon's
investment in its cartoon tiger illustrates the overwhelming public
292. UnitedStates Playing Card Co., 119 Ohio.App.3d at 603, 695 N.E.2d at
1201.
293. See Harley-Davidson, 1998 WL 344271 at 9; United States Playing
Card Co., 119 Ohio.App.3d at 604, 695 N.E.2d at 1201.
294. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 753 F.2d 131
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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connection between Exxon and the "Whimsical Tiger." In light of
existing case law, the court was also correct in holding Exxon
suffered prejudice through its inability to defend itself in this
lawsuit as a result of Kellogg's unreasonable delay. Relevant
document's and witnesses are no longer available to Exxon to use
in preparing a defense to this trademark infringement lawsuit.
Notions of justice require a defendant be allowed to prepare a valid
defense to a legal action, but this would be impossible for Exxon
because of destroyed documents and unavailable witnesses. Had
Kellogg filed their claim in a timely manner without unreasonable
delay, it appears this prejudice would most certainly have been
avoided.
Just as the court in Jabbar-El v. Sullivan,295 found the
unavailability of witnesses, the destruction of records, and the
absence of contemporaneous evidence was clearly prejudicial,
Exxon suffered such prejudice in addition to the economic
investment building the goodwill of the "Whimsical Tiger." In
Jabbar-El,the court found an investigating officer on a shooting
incident who was no longer employed by a relevant party in the
case and was not residing in the state where the action was
transpiring, was prejudicial. Exxon's relevant documents and
witnesses would also be prejudicial to the extent that Exxon could
not prepare an adequate defense to a trademark infringement
lawsuit.
In Harley-Davidson, it was determined a deceased witness did
not prejudice the defendants because the unavailability of the
witness did not appear to decrease the ability of the defendant's to
vindicate themselves." 6
However, unlike Harley-Davidson,
Exxon's unavailability of witnesses would have a detrimental

295. Jabbar-El v. Sullivan, 811 F. Supp. 265, 272 (E.D. Mich. 1992). This
case involved an inmate who brought a civil rights action against a prison guard,
alleging his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the guard fired a shot
during a prison disturbance that nearly struck the inmate.
296. Harley-Davidson, 1998 WL 344271 at 10. The relevant issues in
dispute involved defendant's intent and the nature and result of the parties
negotiations during a time period where another witness would be available to
testify
to thoseCommons@DePaul,
issues.
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effect on Exxon's ability to defend itself, because the relevant time
period at issue is over three decades.
B. The Court Was CorrectIn Decidingthat Kellogg Is Not In a
Position to Claim ProgressiveEncroachment to Defeat
Exxon 's Acquiescence Claim.
Kellogg's claim that Kellogg did not become fully aware of
Exxon's alleged infringement until March of 1996 just seems
implausible. At the time of the filing of this suit, Exxon had been
using its "Whimsical Tiger" in connection with convenience food
stores for nearly ten years. Granted, the number of Exxon Tiger
Mart Stores increased in number from the period from 1986-1996,
but the "Whimsical Tiger" was used to its fullest extent in
connection with the Exxon convenience stores already in existence
beginning in 1986.297 In other words, though a fewer number of
Exxon convenient stores existed, the use of the "Whimsical Tiger"
was used equally throughout these existent stores.298
The next main flaw in Kellogg's argument lies in the SCI
decision where the court held that the plaintiff did not perceive a
trademark violation until the defendant had registered a trademark
bearing the same mark as the plaintiff and entered into the data
processing market of which only the plaintiff was a member for
several years. Kellogg was incorrect in using this case as support
for its progressive encroachment argument.299 The court in
Kellogg was correct in holding that since the SCI court found a
defense of laches can be defeated if changes in a mark over years
and recent entry into the same market occur, the SCI case does not
support Kellogg's position because Exxon does not compete
directly with or has entered into the same market area as Kellogg.

297. As mentioned, in 1986 Exxon distributed "Whimsical Tiger" decals and
featured the slogan "Welcome to Tiger Mart" for display in Exxon's
convenience stores. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 7.
298. It was not the case for example that one convenience store had a 30%
use of the cartoon tiger while another convenience store had a 80% use of the
cartoon tiger. All of the stores made full and equal use of the cartoon tiger in
connection with Exxon's convenience stores.
299. Kellogg, No. 96-3070 G/A at 25.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/5
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From a legal standpoint, the court is most certainly correct in
holding that Exxon did not encroach upon Kellogg's "Tony the
Tiger" mark." ° Exxon is without a doubt known most primarily
for its sale of gasoline, and not its convenience stores. Exxon's
Tiger Mart stores obviously sell food (including Kellogg's cereal
products), but this point is crucial. Exxon convenience stores are
retailers of various food items, not producers. Perhaps if Exxon
decided to produce a cereal called "Flakey Frosts" and used its
"Whimsical Tiger" in the promotion and sale of such cereal by
having a picture of the "Whimsical Tiger" on the box with the
words "They're Excellent!", then the court would be correct in
allowing a case for alleged trademark violation to go to trail, but
those are not the facts. Since Kellogg lacks any significant and
viable evidence to support a claim of progressive encroachment,
the court in Kellogg was correct in its previous holding of
acquiescence as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION

The court in Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation was
correct in dismissing Kellogg's claim for trademark infringement.
The essential facts and case law support are significantly in favor
of the Exxon Corporation on the issue of laches and acquiescence.
Due to Kellogg's unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice to
Exxon, the court was correct in holding a reasonable trier of fact
could not return a verdict for Kellogg on the issue of acquiescence.
In addition, Kellogg's progressive encroachment argument lacked
sufficient evidence to overcome the holding of acquiescence as a
matter of law. Had the facts not pointed to acquiescence on the
part of Kellogg, after applying the Polaroid balancing test 0 1 , it is
300. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 694 F.2d 1150 (9th
Cir. 1992) for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot claim progressive
encroachment where the defendant did not move into direct competition with
the plaintiff and the parties did not offer the same services to any substantial
extent, and also that there is no actual confusion of their services had occurred.
301. The Polaroid balancing test lists eight factors used by a court in
determining the likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement claim:
1. Strength of the mark;
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possible that genuine issues as of material fact may have existed
regarding a possible trademark infringement claim by Kellogg.
However, the present issue is left unresolved because of the court's
correct holding for summary judgment in favor of Exxon on the
issue of acquiescence.

Jack Parrino

3.
4.

The proximity of the products;
The likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap between the
two products;
5. Actual confusion between the two marks;
6.
Defendant's good faith in adopting the masrk;
7.
The quality of the defendant's product;
8.
The sophistication of buyers.
Jordache Enterprises, Inc., v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 515
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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